Through the Telescope II: The Meaning of UCITA by Brennan, Lorin
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 1 Vol. 20 Iss. 1 Article 7 
2000 
Through the Telescope II: The Meaning of UCITA 
Lorin Brennan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
20 Miss. C. L. Rev. 45 (1999-2000) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
THROUGH THE TELESCOPE II:
THE MEANING OF UCITA*
Lorin Brennan**
I. INTRODUCTION
What was the crime of Galileo? It was not merely that he taught the
Copernican heresy. Copernicus' speculations had been known for nearly seventy
years, but were dismissed by the cognoscenti as idle speculations buried within
mathematics of bewildering complexity. No, Galileo's crime was that he pro-
claimed the truth of Copernicus' theory and had the nerve to prove it with his
telescope.'
Our mental images affect how we think about the world. In Galileo's time, it
seemed natural to see the Sun move across the sky and to imagine that it circled
the Earth. Great reputations and lucrative careers hinged on continued public
adherence to this image. When Galileo challenged this world view, he threatened
those entrenched interests to the core.
The Uniform Computer Information Act ("UCITA") also challenges estab-
lished orthodoxy. UCITA proposes new ways of thinking in order to deal with
the transition from an industrial to an information-based economy. Naturally,
there is "controversy," but, on closer inspection, one finds that the dispute sur-
rounding UCITA is not so much with what UCITA says, which is by and large
common sense, but with what it means-which is something else entirely.
The previous installment of this Article discussed the emerging e-commerce
revolution, the move from competitive to cooperative bargaining, and the role of
UCITA (then known as Article 2B) in the process. The revolution steam-rolls on.
New developments make e-contracting more vibrant than ever. This Article
invites you to do what Galileo did: Look through the telescope.
II. THE MOONS OF JUPITER: NEW IMAGES OF CONTRACT
When Galileo looked through his telescope, he saw startling new images invis-
ible to the naked eye: moons circling Jupiter. This discovery directly contradict-
ed his notion of a fixed and immovable Earth at the center of the Universe
around which all planetary bodies revolved. What is our fixed image of a typical
software transaction?
A. Software Imagineering
When we think of a software purchase, we usually think of a customer who
acquires pre-packaged software with a "shrinkwrap" license. Such a transaction
* Formerly published as Through the Telescope 11: The Meaning of UCITA, in the UCC BULLETIN, Vol. 39, Re].
4 and Vol. 40, Rel. I Jan.-Feb. 2000.
** Lorin Brennan is a California attorney who specializes in copyright and international law. He is a principal
in Gray Matter, LLC, a software firm that makes programs for automated contracting and intellectual property
licensing.
1. See GIORGIO DE SANTILLANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO (1955).
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has all the look and feel of a "sale of goods," and thus seems to fit within Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In a more recent variant, the customer
accesses a web page, clicks an "I Agree" icon in a dialog box containing a
license, and downloads (copies) the software. While such a transaction looks a
little different because it deals with electrons moving over a wire, there is still
some authority that electricity is a "good," so the transaction should fit within the
outer edges of the mold. As one court explained, "[t]hat a computer program
may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in
the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible, moveable,
and available in the marketplace."2 In other words, software transactions look
like they fit within the realm of Article 2, where everything revolves around the
fixed notion of a sale of goods. It is a comforting image-and it is a spectacular-
ly wrong image. Before discussing the legal reasons why this is so, let us use our
Web telescope to set firmly in our minds the correct image of a software transac-
tion.
The most dramatic illustration of the real nature of a software transaction is
Linux.3 Linux is a Unix-type operating system originally created by Linus
Torvalds with the help of other developers worldwide. Like many other pro-
grams, Linux is distributed without charge under the "open source" GNU
General Public License. This Article will not repeat all of the terms of this
license, but it will be helpful to view the license in your Web-scope as you read
along, as it is critical to understanding software transactions.' Basically, this
license lets others copy, modify, and redistribute copies of Linux, without charge,
provided that the supplier makes the source code available and disclaims all war-
ranties. The warranty disclaimer is crucial because the creators of Linux do not
support the software (they let the users do that) and do not want to be responsible
for modifications by others.
The Linux Organization allows the downloading of Linux from its site but
does not provide packaged copies to retail stores. Several third-party vendors,
however, do provide retailers with packaged software, such as Red Hat and
Symantec. These vendors all use "shrinkwrap" or "click on" licenses, as
required by their license for Linux. I have a CD from Walnut Creek Software.
Some copies, like mine, come with a full waiver of all warranties, but then my
CD was priced at under $20. Other vendors provide their copies at a higher
price, but they also offer limited support. This means that when a customer
acquires a packaged copy of Linux, two separate legal events occur. The cus-
tomer buys a copy of Linux from a vendor, such as Walnut Creek, and indepen-
dently obtains a license to use the embodied computer program. These are dis-
tinct legal events. The purveyor of the copy (e.g.,. Walnut Creek Software) is not
the owner of the embodied computer program (the Linux Organization).
2. Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991).
3. See Linux Online! (last modified Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.linux.org>.
4. See Linux Online! (last modified July 16, 1999) <http://www.linux.org/info/gnu.html>; see also Free
Software Foundation, GNU's Not Unix (last modified Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www.fsf.org/>; Robert N.
Gomuldiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Softwiare Revolution and the
Implicationsfor Article 2B, 36 H-ous. L. REv. 179 (1999).
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Notice how this transition directly contradicts the fixed idea that a computer
program, when embodied in a floppy disc, loses its separate identity and
becomes entirely a "good." In the case of Linux, the transfer of the copy from
Walnut Creek or Symantec transfers not one iota of interest in the computer pro-
gram. The mere fact that Walnut Creek happens to make a copy does not make
Linux "tangible, moveable, and available in the marketplace." Linux, the com-
puter program, still remains an intangible, copyrighted work. Linux, the comput-
er program, has not moved from the Linux Web page even though it was copied.
To the contrary, as a copyrighted work Linux continues to exist simultaneously
and immovably everywhere its copyright can be enforced. Finally, if the copy
made by Walnut Creek does not conform to the requirements of the GNU Public
License, then that copy is unauthorized, its distribution is infringing, and thus it
is definitely not "available in the marketplace."
B. Enter the Copyright Act
That a computer program is not merely a disc or CD follows directly from sec-
tion 202 of the Copyright Act of 1976 which provides:
Ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copy-
righted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does
transfer of ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copy-
right, convey property rights in any material object.'
Copyright has sometimes been described as the metaphysics of the law, and if
that is true then this is its fundamental metaphysic: a copy is not a copyright. A
book is a physical copy of a separate, intangible, copyrightable literary work; a
compact disc is a copy of a separate, intangible, copyrightable computer pro-
gram. The principle is almost Platonic. A physical copy is but a single instance
of an abstract, intangible idea called a copyrightable work. The instance is not
the essence. The copy is not the copyright.
Section 202 also addresses an important point regarding copyright licenses.
Before enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, there was a dual system of state
common law and federal statutory copyright. Under common law copyright,
transfer of a physical object, such as a manuscript or work of art, was presumed
to transfer the common law copyright as well.6 Section 301 of the Copyright Act
preempted state common law rules. This means that, as a matter of preemptive
federal law, there can be no presumption that transfer of a copy transfers any
5. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
6. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.09[B] (1978) (citing cases).
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right under the copyright. Paying for a copy does not in itself give the buyer any
license to use the copyright.7 This applies regardless of whether the transfer is an
exclusive license8 or a non-exclusive license.' The statement in Advent Systems
Ltd. v. Unisys Corp. that, "once in the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the
program is tangible"'" is directly contrary to Section 202. The copy is tangible,
not the copyrighted computer program.
There is a qualification to this rule, however. Under the Copyright Act, the
owner of a copy has certain limited privileges to use the copy without infringing
the copyright in the embodied work, such as "fair use"" and the "first sale doc-
trine."12 Section 202 does not affect these privileges. Section 202 says that buy-
ing a copy of a computer program, for example, gives no right to exercise an
interest in the copyright of the program beyond the limited privileges under the
Copyright Act that go with ownership of a copy.
Given this difference, what exactly does it mean to say that Article 2 applies to
software transactions? Think again about the customer who acquires a pre-pack-
aged copy of Linux. One response to the question could be that the transaction,
"in its entirety" is really a "sale of goods." But such an answer assumes that the
sale of the copy also made an effective copyright license. This is precisely what
Section 202 of the Copyright Act says cannot be done. 3
When all is said and done, the real reason for trying to apply Article 2 to soft-
ware transactions is to invalidate shrink-wrap and click-on licenses. But if these
licenses are unenforceable, then making and distributing the retail copy of Linux
by Walnut Creek or Symantec is unauthorized, the customer's use of Linux is
unauthorized, and both the customer and the supplier are copyright infringers.
There is no "bona fide purchaser" defense to copyright infringement."' My copy
of Linux includes Apache, a widely used web-hosting program also provided
under an open source license. If all shrink-wrap licenses are unenforceable, then
a significant number of Web users are copyright infringers as well. This is an
absurd result.
Obviously, some law must apply to the entire transaction. If Article 2 is not
this law, the only remaining choice is the common law of contract. But state
common law is not uniform; it is far too general for the specific needs of com-
7. See Saxon v. Blan, 968 E2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating "under Section 202 ... the conveyance of
'ownership rights' to a book will not convey the copyright of the book"); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of
Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (ND. Ill. 1997) (purchasing of diskette containing copyrighted clip art
did not allow downloading clip art onto web page).
8. Saxon, 968 F.2d 676.
9. Applied Info. Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating "As a.result of
Section 202, a court interpreting a [nonexclusive software] licensing agreement must determine ownership of
the copy separately from ownership of the copyright"); PAUL GOLDsTErN, COPYRIGHT § 4.5.1 (c) (2d ed. 1996).
10. Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991).
11. 17U.S.C.§ 106(1994).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 109(1994).
13. For a detailed discussion of these points, including section-by-section comparison of Article 2 and the
Copyright Act, see Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000).
14. Little, Brown & Co. v. American Paper Recycling Corp., 824 F Supp. II (D. Mass. 1993); NIMMER,
supra note 6, at section 13.08.
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puter information transactions and it does not have the facility to enable the
emerging requirements of e-commerce. This is why we need UCITA. UCITA is
a new vision specifically drafted for compatibility with the Copyright Act and
the emerging requirements of e-commerce.
C. Benefits of UCITA
Like any complex program, UCITA has a rich feature set. Included below are
four tables that compare UCITA with current sales law. Table 1 identifies gener-
al improvements. Tables 2 and 3 list the benefits for software developers and
customers, respectively. Table 4 indicates current rules continued in UCITA.
Those interested in further details will find them in the Reporter's Notes"5 or on
Carol Kunze's UCITA web site.1" In broad overview, we can identify four bene-
fits of UCITA: standardization, uniformity, innovation, and modernization.
1. Standardization
The legal standards for information contracting are in disarray. For example,
are digital signatures allowed? If so, when and how? Does clicking an "I Agree"
icon make an enforceable contract? What about contracts made by electronic
agents? What are the rules for digital authentication? What happens in the case
of consumer error? Many e-commerce sites merely ask the customer to fill in
basic payment information. But this leaves many critical terms up in the air. For
example, absent specification, what is the duration of a software license? How
many users are permitted? Can the software reside on more than one machine as
long as it is not used simultaneously? If copies are ordered, who pays the ship-
ping and insurance costs? What warranties, if any, apply? What are the reme-
dies for breach? Should the law presume that without agreement on these points
there is no deal? Or should it provide default rules that apply where the parties
have remained silent? UCITA answers these questions.
2. Uniformity
Commercial contract law is made by the states, not the federal government. To
ensure national consistency, states pass "uniform laws" so someone in Alabama
will be subject to the same rules as someone in Wyoming. Unfortunately, some
types of software transactions are still subject to the varying common law of the
fifty states. These include development contracts, support and maintenance
deals, and on-line access agreements. A dozen states have now enacted different
digital signature rules. E-commerce is national and even global. To realize its
potential, both suppliers and customers need a single set of uniform rules such as
those UCITA provides.
15. Uniform Law Commissioners, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (last
modified Dec. 2, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>.
16. Carol A. Kunze, The 2BGuide (last modified Dec. 14, 1999) <http://www.2bguide.com/>.
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3. Innovation
The law should encourage developers to bring experimental and innovative
new products to the public by allowing them to control their risks with proper
disclaimers. Two examples are Java and, of course, Linux. Java is a software
program developed by Sun Microsystems to run on any platform."' Java is used
extensively on Web pages to enable animation and graphics. The Software
Development Kit can be downloaded for free, subject to Sun's shrink-wrap
license"8 which includes a waiver of implied warranties and consequential dam-
ages. Both Java and Linux offer a critical trade-off: valuable, free software, but
on an "as is" basis. If shrink-wrap and click-on licenses are unenforceable,
meaning that the developers must provide non-disclaimable warranties, it is
doubtful whether such software would be available for free, if at all. Moreover, if
the license is unenforceable, then anyone who downloads (copies) Java or Linux
does so without permission, making them copyright infringers. Innovation
requires trade-offs between time, cost, and quality. UCITA opts in favor of inno-
vation, letting developers and their customers decide for themselves what those
trade-offs should be.
4. Modernization.
Technology has added new ways to make contracts on-line. We need a modem
law to support such activity. UCITA is such a law. For example, below are some
places where UCITA clarifies and expands customer rights in information trans-
actions.
(a) Click-on Contracts: Most e-commerce sites use "click-on" contracts.
Current sales law does not have a uniform answer to their enforceability. UCITA
allows click-on contracts if specific procedures to ensure informed assent are
met.
(b) Mass Market Concept: Current law distinguishes between consumer-use
and business-use. UCITA instead adopts a "mass market" concept that applies to
consumers and businesses alike.
(c) Expanded Return Rights: With pre-packaged, mass-marketed software, if
the consumer reads the shrink-wrap license and does not like it, he can return the
software for a full refund-plus shipping costs. This is more than he would be
entitled to under sales law.
(d) Electronic Agents: Soon consumers will create their own electronic agents
to search the Web and make deals for them. They will have their own "click-on"
contracts to propose to vendors. Current sales law will not allow this practice.
UCITA does.
17. See Sun Microsystems, Inc., The Source for Java Technology (last modified Feb. 10, 2000)
<http://java.sun.com/>.
18. See Sun Microsystems, Inc., The Source for Java Technology (last modified Feb. 10, 2000)
<http://java.sun.com/nav/business/sourceform.html>.
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(e) On-line Warranty Rights: Warranty laws, such as the Manguson-Moss Act,
only apply to sales of tangible products. Where is the "tangible" product when
licensed software is downloaded over the Web? UCITA extends warrantly pro-
tection to electronic deliveries.
(f) New Warranty Rights: The software business includes system integration
contracts, development (service) contracts, and data-processing contracts.
UCITA provides new warranties for these types of transactions.
(g) New Contract Models: Current sales law does not address support and
maintenance contracts, on-line access contracts, and publisher-retailer-customer
dealings, to name a few. UCITA does.
(h) Privacy protection: What if a vendor uses your private information against
your wishes, such as putting your name and address on a mailing list? Does
Article 2 allow consumers to make a contract that forces the vendor to take it
down? UCITA does.
(i) Electronic "Time-Bombs ": Can a vendor use a "time-bomb" that shuts off
your software over a minor dispute? UCITA prohibits this practice where there
is a risk of personal injury. For businesses, it creates exacting disclosure, notice,
and cooling-off periods before "time-bombs" can be used.
Despite these benefits, UCITA is not a consumer protection statute. It is a
commercial code and thus addresses a larger class of both business and con-
sumer transactions. But UCITA does leave intact all consumer protection laws. 9
The following charts list the various benefits of UCITA over current sales law.
Table 1: General Benefits
General Benefits of UCITA Article 2 UCITA
Creates uniform information licensing law No Yes
Establishes rules for electronic contracting No Yes
Establishes rules for electronic signatures No Yes
Allows layered contracting over time No Yes
Allows contracts with electronic agents No Yes
Allows contracts where rights vest before delivery No Yes
Establishes new category of mass market No Yes
Provides warranties for data processing contracts No Yes
Sets standards for providing customer support No Yes
Provides rules for outsourcing contracts No Yes
Sets standards for on-line access contracts No Yes
Extends warranties to electronic deliveries No Yes
19. UNIF. COMPUrER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT, U.L.A. UCITA 1-105(c).
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Table 2: Software Licensor Benefits
Software Licensor Benefits in UCITA Article 2 UCITA
Uniform rules for Internet contracting No Yes
Clear procedures for licensing in mass market No Yes
Workable choice of law & forum rules ? Yes
Guidance for attribution of electronic signatures No Yes
Guidance for modifying on-going support contracts ? Yes
Standard interpretations for license terms No Yes
Confirms exceeding use restrictions is a breach ? Yes
Warranty rules for publishing informational content ? Yes
Clarifies meaning of "personal satisfaction" clauses ? Yes
Reconciles inspection with confidential information No Yes
Clarifies effect of code modifications on warranties No Yes
Right to cure deliverables defects if possible ? Yes
Rules for administering on-line access contracts No Yes
Clear procedures for using self-help "time-bombs" No Yes
Table 3: Software Customer Benefits
Software Customer Benefits in UCITA Article 2 UCITA
Cost free refund right in mass market No Yes
Consumer defense for electronic error No Yes
Procedural safeguards to ensure informed assent No Yes
Right of quiet enjoyment (no infringement) Yes
Presumes some licenses perpetual No Yes
Presumes early transfer of rights (no infringement) ? Yes
Implied warranty for system integration No Yes
Implied warranty for data accuracy No Yes
Codifies advertising can create express warranty 7 Yes
Says publisher's contract does not release retailer No Yes
Right to information about incorporated code No Yes
Allows specific enforcement of privacy rights Yes
Obligation to cure deliverables defect if possible No Yes
Makes licensor agreement not to cancel enforceable ? Yes
Safeguards on licensor self-help "time bombs" No Yes
[VOL. 20:45
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Table 4: Rules Continued in UCITA
Continuation of Current Rules Current Law UCITA
Consumer protection law Yes Yes
Unconscionability doctrine Yes Yes
Obligation of good faith and fair dealing Yes Yes
Defers to federal intellectual property law Yes Yes
Express warranty law Yes Yes
Implied warranty of merchantability for programs Yes Yes
Implied warranty of fitness adapted for programs Yes Yes
Requires disclaimers in writing (a record) Yes Yes
Enforceability of no oral modification clauses Yes Yes
Interpretation of deals by industry standards Yes Yes
Right to adequate assurances of performance Yes Yes
Risk of loss in delivery of copies Yes Yes
Interpretation of delivery terms Yes Yes
These are the benefits of UCITA over current law. But this is not the end of
the story. New and even better possibilities are already appearing on the horizon.
I11. "BUT IT MOVES"--E-CONTRACTING COMETH
When the Inquisitors demanded that Galileo renounce his claim that moons
were in fact revolving around Jupiter, he uttered his immortal retort: eppur si
mouve-"but it moves." His point was that when the facts contradict our fixed
ideas, it is our ideas that must change. We have already discussed how the fixed
idea of a software transaction as no more than a "sale of goods" is inadequate.
But the possibilities for e-contracting events now emerging on the Web require
even more dramatic rethinking of old ideas.
A. Bots Revisited
The previous installment of this Article introduced bots. To repeat, a bot is a
software program that traverses the web's hypertext structure by retrieving a doc-
ument and, recursively, all documents referenced in it." Normal web browsers
are not bots because they are operated by a human being. The term bot has
become a common synonym for electronic agent, despite certain technical differ-
ences." Some examples of bots are:
20. Martijn Koster, The Web Robots FAQ (visited April 10, 2000) <http://info.webcrawler.com/mak/
projects/robots/faq.html>.
2 1. See RicHAD MURcH & TONY JOHNSON, INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE AGENTS (1999) ["MuRcH & JOHNSON"].
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(a) Chatterbots-used for chatting on the Web.
(b) Searchbots-general agents used for searching.
(c) Spiderbots-agents that crawl from site to site searching for new Web con-
tent; they are used by the major search engines, such as Lycos and Infoseek.
(d) Newsbots-ook for news.
(e) Knowbots-short for "knowledgebots," seek out specific knowledge.
(f) Shoppingbots-help find deals on-line.
(g) Sexbots-well, you guessed it.
The number of Web sites devoted to bot information has grown spectacularly.
The BotSpot®, "The Spot for All Bots on the Net"22 still remains the classic
starting point. Several other sites are listed in the sidebar on the next page.
B. Next Generation Bots
Bots are evolving. The latest developments include "autonomous agents"
which travel between Web sites using their own selection criteria, and "intelligent
agents," which are programs that help users to perform specific acts, such as
selection, form filling, or site location.23
An influential Al textbook says:
[a]n agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through
sensors and acting on its environment through effectors. A human agent has
eyes, ears and other organs for sensors, and hands, legs, mouth and other body
parts for effectors .... A software agent has encoded bit strings as its precepts
and actions. 21
In the view of these writers, an intelligent agent, or ideal rational agent, is one
that does "whatever action is expected to maximize its performance measure, on
the basis of the evidence provided by the precept sequence and whatever built-in
knowledge the agent has. '25 IBM offers the following definition: "Intelligent
agents are software agents that carry out some set of operations on behalf of a
user or another program with some degree of independence or autonomy and, in
so doing, employ some knowledge or representation of the user's goals or
desires."26
22. BotSpot (visited April 10, 2000) <http://www.botspot.coml>.
23. MURCH & JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 46-47.
24. SrtuJT J. RUSSELL & PETER NORViG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACHf 31 (1995).
25. Id. at 33.
26. MURCH & JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 10.
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The goal, of course, is not just to define such electronic agents but to build
them. The reasons are pressing. Agents that merely traverse the Internet and
send back information recursively, downloading every link encountered, generate
an increasing amount of network traffic. What is needed instead are self-directed
agents that can move from site to site and process an interaction locally. The
mantra is that: move the computations to the data rather than the data to the
computations.27 This new breed of electronic agents will need the following
attributes:
(a) autonomy-the agent senses and reacts to the environment on its own agen-
da, not tied to the central server;
(b) intelligence-in the sense that it employs knowledge and automated reason-
ing methods to respond to a set of goals; and
(c) mobility-meaning that it can move freely through the environment based on
internally generated decisions about where to find data and information.
The entities researching and developing mobile, autonomous, intelligent elec-
tronic agents are increasing at a stunning rate. AgentBuilder®, a company that
provides tools for building electronic agents, has an extensive list of commercial
27. Id. at 101.
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products and academic research papers listed on its site.28 The Agent Society, a
new professional organization for those interested in e-agents, lists the following
categories of "Agents and Application Taxomonies" under development. 9
Mobile agents Process/workflow control agents
Stationary agents Operational support agents
Intelligent agents Personal assistant agents
Autonomous agents Service integration agents
Profile agents Multi-agents
Community of interest agents Simulator agents
Cooperating agents Planning and resource allocation agents
Finding, gathering and filtering agents Agent toolkits
Electronic commerce agents
What does this mean for consumers? In the very near future, software pro-
grams-intelligent, mobile agents-will be available to traverse the web on the
consumer's behalf. The agents will not only be able to identify desirable sites,
they will be able to conduct an interaction at the site, extracting information that
meets the consumer's individually selected criteria. Think about the current sites
on the Web for buying a car or airline tickets. Now consumers have to visit those
sites directly to find what they want. Soon consumers will have their own elec-
tronic agents-bots-that can visit those sites for them and identify the best
offerings.
Better than that, the agents can even negotiate the deal. To see what this really
means, the site to visit is Market Maker at the MIT Media Lab site.' The previ-
ous version of this Article discussed the developments at the Media Lab and the
plans for Market Maker (called Kasbah in an earlier version). It is now up and
running. Market Maker allows buyers or sellers to encapsulate their desires in an
electronic agent, give it a dealing strategy, and send it into an electronic market-
place of other agents to make deals. Turn your web-scope there and try it.
C. Bargaining Protocols
Of course, we must design the rules under which agents can come to agree-
ment for automated contracting to operate effectively. Professors Jeffrey
Rosenschein of Hebrew University and Gilad Zlotkin of MIT have recently pub-
lished a study that uses a combination of distributed Al and game theory to do
just that."
Their approach distinguishes a protocol and a strategy. A protocol refers to
"the public rules by which agents ... come to agreements."32 In legal terms, a
protocol would mean the rules for contract formation in UCITA. A strategy is
28. See Agent Builder, Agent Construction Tools (last modified Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.agentbuilder.
com/agenttools/index.html>.
29. Agent Society, Agent Society Home Page, (visited April 10, 2000) <http://www.agent.org>.
30. David Wang, Market Maker (visited April 10, 2000) <http:ecomrnmerce.media.mit.edu/maker/maker.htm>.
31. JEFFREY S. ROSENSCHEIN & GILAD ZLOTKIN, RULES OF ENCOUNTER: DESIGNING CONVENTIONS FOR
AuroMATED NEGOTIATIONS AMONG COMPUTERS (1994) ["ROSENSCHEIN & ZLOTKIN"]
32: Id. at 3.
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the private way an agent elects to behave in a particular interaction using the pro-
tocol. For example, a strategy might involve expressly stating that there is no
agreement until all terms are agreed upon, rather than allowing agreement only
on essential terms. Ideally, the protocol should have, among others, the follow-
ing attributes: (1) efficiency, meaning the system does not encourage agreements
that squander resources; (2)fairness, meaning the system does not arbitrarily dis-
criminate against any particular type of agent; and (3) transparency, meaning the
system encourages strategies that do not rely on deception or duplicity.
Let me give two examples of how this will work. The first, drawn from the
work of Professors Rosenschein and Zlotkin, deals with what we can call "long
distance bargaining."' Instead of signing up a telephone company as a fixed
long distance carrier, imagine instead a system for automated negotiation. Each
caller has an electronic agent attached to the telephone line. When the caller
places a call, the carrier responds with a price quote for that call at that moment.
There is no fixed rate. On-time pricing could be determined by a number of fac-
tors. AT&T's server is overloaded; MCI has excess capacity; Sprint is offering a
special rate. Maybe the call is for data transmission and the user wants better
line quality, albeit for a higher price. Regardless of the circumstances, negotia-
tion occurs for the price for this call right now.
What is the protocol under which the bidding should occur? One possibility
would be that the lowest bid wins. However, this leads to suboptimal results.
While no company has an incentive to bid a price lower than its true cost, there is
an incentive to bid high. Is there a bidding protocol that encourages phone com-
panies to bid their true cost? "The answer is a qualified yes."3" It is called
Vickrey's Mechanism. Basically, it says that the lowest bid wins, but the price
paid by the user is the second lowest rate. This situation encourages phone com-
panies to bid accurately. A bid too low might mean the company wins but could
have to provide the service at below its cost. A bid too high might mean the
company does not get the contract. While it may cost slightly more, the con-
sumer will still benefit from accurate bids. "By separating the issues of who
wins the bid, and how much the winner gets, we've fundamentally altered the
way in which computers should play the game."
35
D. Settlement Games
Now let's move into high-gear with an example that may be more immediately
meaningful to lawyers. Turn your Web-scope to cyber$ettle.3 This is a web site
that allows parties to engage in automated settlement negotiations on line.
According to the site, the negotiations occur as follows:"
33. Id. at 9-12.
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id.
36. cybersettle (visited March 26, 2000) <http://www.cybersettle.com/>.
37. cybersettle (visited March 26, 2000) <http://www.cybersettle.com/how/index.htm>.
1999]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
(a) Sponsor or claimant submits three settlement offers or demands for each
claim via the Internet into cyber$ettle's secure website.
(b) cyberSettle then advises that the case is online and available for settlement.
(c) Each party has three opportunities (rounds) to settle. One demand or offer is
entered for each round.
(d) cyber$ettle instantly compares each demand to the settlement offer and noti-
fies the parties of a settlement on screen. A written confirmation follows.
(e) Currently participants are utilizing the following formula:
1. If the offer or demand is within 30%, or $5000, of the demand, the claim
is settled for the median amount.
2. If the offer or demand differs by more than 30%, or $5000, in all three
rounds, the claim will not settle.
3. If the settlement offer is the same or greater than the claimant's demand,
the claim is settled for the demand amount.
Cyber$ettle gives the following illustration:
cyber$ettle Illustration 1: Offer is within 30% of Demand
Round O'ffr Dernandto~o Re,]" tSl
Cyber$ettle does not reveal any offer or demand; only the settlement amount is
revealed. This is certainly an innovative approach and one which allows parties a
unique and effective means to settle disputes. But let's ask a different question:
can we automate it?
The cyber$ettle approach could be modeled as a finite, two person, non-coop-
erative game of imperfect information.' In fact, the underlying model would be
the well-known game of "chicken." Notice that in cyber$ettle parties only have
38. A full discussion of game theory is beyond this Article. Interested parties should see DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
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three chances to make settlement offers. Obviously, if there is a desire to settle, a
participant may adjust a later settlement offer if the first was not accepted. But
there is no requirement to do so. In fact, one strategy may be never to change a
settlement offer at all, on the theory-or hope-that the other party will cave in.
Of course, if both parties adopt this strategy, there will never be a settlement.
This is why the game of chicken has no optimal solution, or what are called
"pure" strategies-i.e., the game can only be played a fixed number of times.
Another illustration is labor negotiations, which follow a similar game form and
in which parties are prohibited from making inflexible offers.39
Now what would happen if we were to encapsulate the settlement offers into
electronic agents? These electronic agents make an iterated series of far more
than three offers in a very short time. Allowing the game to be played many
times changes the game dynamic to one of "mixed" strategies. In that case, as
John Nash showed, there will be an "equilibrium point."' In other words, we can
devise a bargaining strategy for both electronic agents that will yield an "opti-
mal" result, meaning that, if we assume both parties act rationally, neither party
can do better by pursuing any other strategy. Professors Rosenschein and Zlotkin
discuss at length such a strategy, called the Extended Zeuthen Strategy, although
not in the context of cyber$ettle. The details are beyond the scope of this Article.
The point, however, is that by using electronic agents parties can engage in more
effective bargaining and in ways not previously possible. And they can do so in
ways that yield the optimal result for everyone involved. The implications for
legal theories of contracting and bargaining are profound.
E. New E-contracting
This move to electronic, automated bargaining demonstrates three fundamental
changes from prior contracting models.
1. Parties. The parties will not be set in rigid roles of "seller" and "buyer," or
"licensor" and "licensee." Consumers will be as much creators and suppliers of
information as will be companies. Roles will be flexible, with parties capable of
dynamically adopting multiple roles as provider or recipient in any transaction.
2. Methods. Negotiation need not occur in the expensive, inefficient, face-to-
face bargaining methods of the past. Instead, negotiation can happen electroni-
cally through the medium of electronic agents and standard forms. UCITA-
102(a)(66) defines a "standard form" as "a record or a group of related records
containing terms prepared for repeated use in transactions and so used in a trans-
action in which there was no negotiation by individuals except to set the price,
quantity, method of payment, selection among standard options, or time or
method of delivery." 1 Most of the complaints have been about the use of
39. Id.
40. ROSENC-iEIN & ZLOTKIN, supra note 31, at 48.
41. UNIF. COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT, U.L.A. UCITA section 102(a)(66).
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shrinkwraps and other "standard forms." But notice that electronic agents will
have to negotiate using standardized protocols that will operate as UCITA stan-
dard forms. This standardization allows the development of methods with prov-
able efficiency, transparency and fairness.
3. Structure. The structure of the negotiating protocols and the available bar-
gaining strategies will be not be based on ad hoc rules, but instead on a solid
mathematical foundation using game theory and distributed Al that will allow for
maximum utility for all parties.
IV CONCLUSION
Here then, is the meaning of UCITA: a new world view. The old, contracting
world view sees everything revolving around the Holmesian notion of "merchant
bargaining," of two parties sitting around a table, face-to-face, haggling out a
contract term by term. Their lawyers sit at their elbows, quill pens and parch-
ment aquiver, duly documenting the "mutual assent." There is nothing wrong
with this approach in its proper place, and it certainly places lawyers in a flatter-
ing role. But it is not the only possibility.
The world of automated, on-line contracting offers another vision, one that
includes the old model but expands far beyond it. It is not about protectionism
but empowerment, not about regulation and restraint but about authorization and
party autonomy. In a word, it is about freedom of contract. This is the world
view of UCITA.
What, in the end, was the crime of Galileo? That he dared look through the
telescope and herald a Renaissance.
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